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We analyse the impact of COVID-19 on the world economic system through 
the three components of globalization: economic, social and political 
globalization, respectively. The pandemic and the economic policy response 
have hit these aspects to different degrees.  
• Economically, the quick recovery of world merchandise trade stands 
out.  
• Socially, the reduction in tourism is the largest shock but here a sharp 
recovery is possible.  
• Politically, the end of US membership of the WHO and the difficulty 
of global economic coordination in the G20 are key drivers for 2020. 
The election of a new US President allows for a quick reversal. 
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Does COVID-19 threaten globalization? 
1 Introduction 
Globalization has been referred to as a multifaceted concept that describes the 
process of creating networks of connections among actors at intra- or 
multicontinental distances (Gygil et al. 2019). According to these authors, it is a 
more holistic concept that captures the increased interdependence of national 
economies, and the trend towards greater integration of different varieties of 
flows such as information, goods, labour and capital. Because of this broad 
definition of globalization, continuous attempts have been made, starting with 
Dreher (2006) to develop a more comprehensive composite index such as the 
KOF Globalization Index that encompasses three main dimensions of the 
process of globalization, namely, economic, political and social dimensions. 
Increased globalization has been a constant feature of the world economy since 
the 1970s and especially since 1990 after the fall of the Iron Curtain and with 
China gathering speed.  
More recently, however, there has been growing discontent and negative 
sentiments about the effect of globalization (Stiglitz 2002, 2018). These negative 
sentiments have manifested in different ways through the election of President 
Donald Trump, the Brexit and attacks on the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Under the aegis of then-President D. Trump who not only staged an attack on 
the WTO by refusing to appoint new members to the WTO’s Appellate Body, 
but also launched trade wars against China, North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU), putting further strains on 
world trade and international cooperation. Afesorgbor and Beaulieu (2021) 
argue the Trump presidency strained diplomatic relationship with close allies and 
undermined the rules-based global system, and this therefore created uncertainty 
for global trade. 
These occurrences that constitute a major setback to the pace of 
globalization set the stage of growing protectionism and nationalism in the 
world. These actors were political, but more recently the outbreak of the 
COVID-19 pandemic introduces new – medical – threat to globalization 
emanating from health risk posed by the contagious nature of the COVID-19.  
In a sense the pandemic reflects both globalization (a virus went global in a few 
weeks thanks to high level of globalization and interconnectedness (Lipscy, 
2020) and deglobalization (the breakdown of international cooperation and the 
re-emergence of zero-sum thinking and raw beggar-thy-neighbour polices on the 
markets for medical productive gear, medical machinery and vaccines).  
The COVID-19 outbreak provided a threat to both lives and livelihood 
(UNCTAD, 2020) which are the basic foundation for national economies to 
thrive and thereby triggered an effect for the global economy. Because of the 
strong and interdependent global production value and linkages coupled with 
the closure of international borders, businesses, and factories, the economic 
expectations and forecasts were generally pessimistic. The prospect of the world 
plunging into another major and long-term economic recession comparable to 
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the Great Depression in 1929/30 and the Great Recession of 2007/8 was on 
the mind of many economists and international organizations.  
Figure 1 
Forecasts for real world trade growth in 2020 
 
Note: O = Optimistic scenario, P = Pessimistic Scenario 
 
Indeed, in April 2020, the outlook for the world economy and especially the 
world trading system was dismal. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic 
came on top of that and led to an unprecedented dive of world trade by 15 
percent in April 2020 and the trade collapse initially was stronger than previous 
episodes of downfall. During the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic 
projections for the contraction of the annual volume of world trade in 2020 
ranged from minus 10 to minus 32 percent (see Figure 1). The outlook for 
globalization was grim. The pandemic at the same time highlighted the 
importance of global interdependence and the awareness of the need to develop 
a collective global strategy (Committee for Development Policy-CDP, 2020). 
Initially, the occurrence of the viral infection was thought to be only a problem 
for China but within a couple of weeks the outbreak of the novel COVID-19 
virus became first an international problem and soon afterwards a global issue 
and was officially announced a pandemic. By symmetry, the eradication of the 
viral spread will require international cooperation and a global effort such that 
no single country is left behind to form a pool for new variants and future 
outbreaks. Vaccines must be made available and affordable to all countries. Just 
as globalization has ramifications for all countries, the health of different nations 
is intertwined as a pandemic is a ‘public bad’: the health of one nation affects the 
health of the other (van Bergeijk, 2013; CDP, 2020). 
    The reports of the expected death of globalization, however, were – with 
hindsight – grossly exaggerated. Admittedly, the fall in world trade had initially 
been exceptionally strong indeed. Recovery, however, set in early compared to 
the two major historical episodes of trade collapse during the Great Recession 
and the Great Depression suggesting stronger resilience of world trade than 
anticipated by the international organizations. Figure 2 compares the 
developments of the world merchandise trade volume during the three major 
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world trade collapses that occurred during the Great Depression in the 1930s, 
the Global Financial crisis in 2008/9 and the lockdowns during the first wave of 
the COVID 19 pandemics.   
Figure 2 
Comparing the COVID collapse to the 2008/9 world trade collapse  
and the Great Depression 
 
Sources: Updated from Meijerink et al., 2020. 
 
The comparison starts half a year before the peak level of trade just before 
the collapse that we use to identify period ‘zero’. The contractions in 2008/9 
and 2020 both started to bite after a quarter but in the fourth month of the 
COVID collapse world trade was already 15 percent below previous peak level, 
while this was ‘only’ 8 percent during the 2008/9 World Trade Collapse. Global 
merchandise trade in May 2020, however, bottomed out, and full recovery was 
achieved in November 2020. At the comparable point of the 2008/9 trade 
collapse the volume of world trade was still 17 percent below pre-crisis peak 
level. In the 1930s world trade one year into the collapse was 28 percent below 
pre-crisis peak level. Clearly, the world trade collapses before the COVID-19 
contraction were both deeper and much more protracted (van Bergeijk, 2019; 
2021). 
The resilience of world trade during the ‘natural experiment’ of the Great 
Recession is remarkable and the starting point of research into factors 
determining its elasticity (van Bergeijk et al., 2017). The COVID-19 trade 
collapse adds a second ‘natural experiment’ with even stronger resilience of real-
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2020 was a bad year for globalization and therefore we need to be careful in our 
conclusion about the pandemic threat for globalization and the future outlook. 
We will first discuss the developments during the COVID-19 Pandemic. 
We organize this discussion of developments into separate sections, that 
recognize that deglobalization, like globalization, has several dimensions (Dreher 
et al., 2008; Gygli et al., 2018).1 This is important as the threat of COVID-19 
would have heterogeneous effect on different dimensions of globalization. In 
addition, the effect would also differ for different regions or countries depending 
on their level of exposure to the viral infection and the integration of the region 
or country in the world economy. Apart from that, the COVID-19 effect would 
also have differential effect on different industries, sectors or products. For 
instance, UNCTAD (2020) shows that there was upsurge (as would be expected) 
in global merchandise trade of medical production in the second quarter of 2020 
during the peak of the pandemic. Clearly, in analysing the effect of COVID-19 
on globalization, one must take different dimensions, products and countries 
into perspective. UNCTAD (2020) further highlights the heterogenous effect of 
COVID-19 crisis on different dimensions of economic globalization such as 
trade, FDI, global production and employment as well as the effect for different 
countries.  
This working paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the eco-
nomic dimension that relates to interaction between the private sectors in dif-
ferent countries (or within multinational firms) and covers such items as foreign 
trade (exports and imports of goods and services), private capital flows (includ-
ing bank lending, portfolio investment, mergers and acquisitions, Foreign Direct 
Investment - FDI). The social dimension is discussed in Section 3 and  covers 
interactions between (groups of) individuals from different countries as being 
shaped by tourism, migration, remittances as well as cultural and personal ex-
changes. Section 4 focusses on the political dimension of globalization, that is 
the interactions between States (both bilaterally and multilaterally) as observed 
by (changes in) their membership of international institutions, involvement in 
Treaties, participation in peace-keeping missions and development assistance. 
Having sketched the developments during 2020 we analyse the post-COVID 19 
outlook in Section 5. 
  
 
1 We deviate from the common procedure in the literature on globalization to include 
remittances and (official development) assistance. 
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2 Economic globalization and COVID-19 
Economic globalization has been conceptualized by means of flows of goods, 
services, capital and information in connection to long distance market 
transactions (Dreher 2006). For the economic dimension of globalization, Gygli 
et al. (2019) further distinguish between trade and financial globalization. They 
measure economic globalization using de facto variables such as foreign trade 
(exports and imports of goods and services) and de jure factors including trade 
regulations, tariffs and trade agreements. Similarly, private capital flows 
(including bank lending, portfolio investment, mergers and acquisitions, FDI) 
were used as de facto measures of financial globalization while the restriction on 
capital flows, capital account openness and international investment are de jure 
measures of financial globalization. 
How the outbreak of COVID-19 would affect these different indicators 
under economic globalization can differ. Already, van Bergeijk (2019, 2021) 
argued that prior to the COVID-19, many developed countries were 
experiencing lower levels of economic globalization as a result of the anti-
globalization wave that has engulfed Global North. The pandemic would likely 
deepen the impetus of the deglobalization trend and could even have future 
implications. The onset of the COVID-19 crisis created panic buying in many 
countries resulting acute shortages of products on shelves of most retail 
companies. Such occurrences create the notion of over-dependence of the 
domestic supply chain on foreign suppliers. This could, consequently, be used 
as a subtle call to enact protectionist policies in order to build the capacity of 
domestic industries to promote self-sufficiency in the production of agricultural 
and manufacturing goods (Kerr, 2020). 
Although the pandemic is global, different regions and countries 
experienced differential effect on various indicators of the economic dimension 
of globalization. In particular, different regions or countries are exposed 
differently as they are integrated into the global economy at different intensities. 
The level of integration determines the size of the impact of the pandemic on 
international trade, capital flows and FDI. Therefore, regions or countries that 
are well integrated in the global economy experience higher rate of infections. 
This seems to be the case as many less developed countries (LDCs) especially 
African countries that are less integrated in the world economy have significantly 
low rate of infections. 
Merchandise trade  
Figure 3 shows the heterogeneity of merchandise exports and imports before 
COVID-19 outbreak and during the pandemic. Although the figure shows a 
general decline in growth rates for merchandize trade for all countries, the rate 





Global and regional patterns of merchandise trade 
 
Source: CPB World Trade Monitor, accessed March 2021. 
Trade in services 
Figure 3 deals with merchandise trade only and misses an important part of the 
puzzle: international trade in services, as it accounts for 25 percent of total trade 
(Shingal, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic could be expected to be less 
deleterious for trade in services based on the argument that service trade is less 
sensitive to demand shocks and less dependent on supply finance (Arui, 2020). 
However, Shingal (2020) argues that social-distancing and contagion-related 
fears would hinder trade in services as services transaction such as health and 
education services, movement of workers (IT professionals requiring to work 
onsite) and especially tourism require some form of physical proximity between 
buyers and sellers. Preliminary statistics from UNCTAD (2020) also shows a 
greater negative effect for services trade.  The statistics shows that globally 
services trade contracted by 21 percent in the second quarter of 2020 compared 
to 18 percent decline in trade in goods within the same period. 
Trade by product 
Breaking down the effect of decline in merchandise exports across the different 
products or sectors shows that effect of pandemic was heterogenous. In 
particular, sectors such as automotive and chemical sectors declined significantly 
in major trading economies like the US, Europe and China while sectors within 
the textile, office machinery and precision instruments actually witnessed an 
increase in exports from China (UNCTAD, 2020). Trade in medical related 
products including personal protective equipment, sanitizers and ventilators 
witnessed a particularly sharp increase of 186 percent in the second quarter of 





Advanced economies import Emerging economies import
Advanced economies export Emerging economies export
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routers, laptops and portable storage. It is often said that globalization has 
winners and losers; clearly the same can be said at the sectoral level for the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
Foreign Direct Investment  
The heterogeneity of the COVID-19 impact on international flows is not limited 
to merchandise and services trade and also occurs for FDI flows (Figure 4). 
Although the trajectory of falling FDI predates the COVID-19 pandemic 
reflecting that deglobalization was already predating the pandemic, the rapid and 
significant decline in 2020 stands out and exceed the decline of the Great 
Recession. According to UNCTAD (2021), the impact of COVID-19 on FDI 
was immediate, as global FDI flows declined almost by nearly half in 2020.  
Figure 4 
FDI inflows: global and by group of economies  
 
Source: Demena (2017) and UNCTAD (2021).  
Notes: All FDI figures are billions of US dollars at current prices and current exchange rates 
 
Figure 4 shows that COVID-19 bit into FDI inflows by about 42 percent 
globally (see also Figure 5). This can be compared to the global financial crisis 
that started in September 2007, but global FDI contracted largely later in 2009 
by 39 percent, plummet at an accelerated rate lately (Demena, 2017). Figure 4 
also shows the immediacy of the COVID-19 impact on the global FDI. Clearly, 
the impact of the COVID-19 on FDI contraction is both deeper and more 
immediate as compared to the Global Financial Crisis. Again, this decline was 
mostly concentrated in developed countries, with only marginal decline for the 
group of developing countries. As forecasted by UNCTAD (2021), the latter is 













Foreign direct investment inflows across different regions  
(comparison between 2019 and 2020) 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2021).  
 
Figure 5 shows the decline in FDI across different regions of the world. 
Developed nations experienced 69 percent decrease in 2020 compared to 12 
percent decline for developing economies. Unexpectedly, the impact among 
the transition economies were very sharp (about 77 percent), and UNCTAD 
suggested that this is mainly due to the decline of the flows to the Russian 
Federation. Looking ahead, according to the forecast of the UNTAD (2021), 
the pattern of FDI is expected to remain weak to recover in 2021, indicating 
the outlook remains dire. Thus COVID-19 impact will continue to provide a 


































































































3 Social globalization and COVID-19 
There are three different sub-dimensions of social globalization and these 
include interpersonal, informational and cultural aspects of globalization 
(Dreher, 2006). According to Gygli et al. (2019) interpersonal globalization 
involves personal links and/or interaction with foreign nationals through events 
such as migration, international telephone calls and international remittances 
paid or received by citizens. Informational globalization measures the actual flow 
of ideas, knowledge and images and it is measured using key variables such as 
internet bandwidth, international patents and technology exports.  The cultural 
aspect of social globalization also relates the penetration of foreign cultural 
products such as franchise acquisition or foreign trademarks applications. 
Keohane and Nye (2000) argue that social globalization is the most pervasive 
aspect of globalization. Relating the COVID-19 to social globalization is thus 
important and also because the sub-dimensions could be affected differently. 
First, COVID-19 reduces interpersonal globalization. Many countries impose 
travel restriction on both residents and foreign nationals moving in and out of 
the country. The border closure would directly hinder the temporary migration, 
especially tourist and foreign students’ movement in and out of countries. 
Figure 6 
International (World) tourist arrivals  
(monthly per cent change comparison between 2020 and 2019) 
 


























Change in per cent between 2019 and 2020
14 
 
    Figure 6 confirms the possible negative effect on international tourist 
arrivals in the world. Comparing the percentage growth month-over-month for 
2019/2020, Figure 6 shows 96 – 97 percent decrease during the peak of the 
COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns. Although this has reduced marginally 
over the years the percentage decline remains substantially large even by 
December 2020 (85 percent lower than as compared to December 2019).  It 
were not only the travel restrictions imposed by many governments that 
dissuaded tourist travels; most people may have also voluntarily decided to cease 
travels for personal safety reasons because even when the travel restrictions or 
border closures were removed as suggested by the reported developments in the 
fourth quarter of 2020: there was still limited number of tourist travels in 2020 
compared to 2019. According to the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) 
world tourism barometer, at the beginning of 2021 the demand for international 
travel remained very weak (87 percent below the January 2019). At the time of 
writing, amid new outbreaks and tighter travel restrictions along with the slower 
and quite uneven distribution of vaccination roll-out across countries and 
regions a continued slowdown was expected. The UNWTO outlined two 
scenarios for recovery in 2021 as compared to the historic lows of 2020. In the 
optimistic scenario international travel would rebound in July 2021, leading to a 
partial recovery by 66 percent. In the pessimistic scenario, the recovery sets in 
September 2021, resulting to a 22 percent recovery. On balance international 
arrivals remain 50 to 70 percent below the 2019 level of international arrivals.        
Figure 7 
Migrant remittance inflows (US$ Billion) 
 
Source: KNOMAD - https://www.knomad.org/  
 
Migrant remittances were also affected not because of any formal 
restrictions on remittances but mainly because of a negative labour market shock 
on immigrant employment. The latter is confirmed by Demena et al. (2021), 
finding that overall COVID-19 negatively impact various labour market 
outcomes, in particular the effect is larger for developed countries, where 














migration represents an important dimension of globalization and family 
remittances constitute a major factor in integrating. Borjas and Cassidy (2020) 
find that in the US labour market, COVID-19 related labour market disruptions 
severely affected immigrants. They explain that joblessness was higher among 
immigrants because they were less likely to work in jobs that could be performed 
remotely. This stylized fact was also confirmed by Capps et al. (2020) and they 
explained that COVID-19 severely affected industries that had higher 
concentration of immigrants especially Latinos in the US.  Figure 7 shows the 
long-term increase in remittances inflow worldwide and also for developing 
countries, as well as the sharp decrease during COVID-19 era. There was a 
similar decline for remittances following the global financial crisis in 2008/9. It 





4 Political globalization and COVID-19 
Political globalization captures the ability of countries to engage in international 
political cooperation as well as the diffusion of government policies (Gygli et al., 
2019). Key variables used in measuring political globalization include 
membership of international institutions, involvement in Treaties, participation 
in peace-keeping missions and development assistance. These various indicators 
measure how much a government is influenced by foreign counterparts and 
resources. 
The initial outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic affected international 
cooperation negatively mainly because of the blame game between the two 
largest economies in the world, the US and China. The Trump administration 
blamed China of being less transparent and for failing to contain COVID-19 
virus and allowing it to spread to other countries. This was also followed by 
counter accusations from China who also blamed the US of mismanaging and 
failing to take the pandemic seriously (Horsley, 2020). In addition, the Trump 
presidency undermined global cooperation and global public health when the 
United States cut financial support to the World Health Organization (WHO) 
during the middle of the pandemic. Brown and Susskind (2020) link the rising 
anti-globalization sentiments and nationalism (Make America Great Again, 
Brexit) as impediments that undermined the willingness of countries to 
cooperate their responses effectively in fighting the pandemic. 
Global public good 
This notwithstanding the occurrence of COVID-19 also presents an opportunity 
to correct the earlier skirmishes and for a more global cooperation as the world 
presents a concerted effort under the aegis of the WHO in combating the virus. 
Brown and Susskind (2020) have argued that the COVID-19 pandemic should 
be treated as global public good through international cooperation and that will 
be an effective and efficient strategy to control the pandemic. The increasing 
level of globalization and interdependence of nations make it imperative for the 
world to treat COVID-19 as a global public good because if a single country fails 
to control the virus within its borders, it is possible the infection could spread 
beyond its borders to the rest of the world (Brown and Susskind 2020). 
Additionally, comparative and competitive advantages in vaccine development 
and the production of personal protective equipment would be important. 
In response to COVID-19, there was not a significant decrease in the 
commitment of countries to their mandatory and voluntary contributions to the 
United Nations (UN) as indicated in Figure 8. Consistently, there was only a 
marginal decline across the different months in 2020 compared 2019 terms 
contribution of members of the United Nations (UN) regular budget. The UN 
honour roll shows that 144 members paid their regular budget assessment in full 
in 2020 compared to 146 members in 2019.2 This is also significant considering 
the fact the United States which is a major contributor to the WHO announced 
 




the cut of financial support to the WHO. The US cut of financial assistance to 
WHO will have major implication for the global health response to the 
pandemic. 
Figure 8 
Number of Member States contributed for the United Nations regular budget  
in 2019 and 2020 
 
Source: United Nations: https://www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/honourroll.shtml  
 
Although global cooperation did not start immediately with the outbreak of 
COVID-19, there were many efforts later by different countries to cooperate in 
fighting the pandemic. European countries provided medical gear to China in 
the early phase of the pandemic. Later, China supported adversely affected 
countries like Italy which became the epicentre for the COVID-19 in Europe. 
The medical assistance and supplies aid from China to Italy amounted to about 
31 tons of medical supplies during the peak of the crisis.3  Medical assistance 
from China was received with mixed reactions mainly because it was also 
believed that the gesture was divisive for the Europe and such acts would play 
to Chinese geopolitical advantage within the region.4 Medically, the Chinese 
scientists role in the sequencing of the genome and development of tests that 
were shared with the health facilities across the world also helped in detecting 
the cases and manage the spread of the virus (Horsley, 2020). 
 
3 https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/14/coronavirus-eu-abandoning-italy-china-aid/ 
, accessed 31 March 2021.  
4 https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/14/coronavirus-eu-abandoning-italy-china-aid/  
















Equally, international assistance of medical aid from countries like Russia 
sent to Italy (Biscop, 2020) and even the US signals the importance of global 
partnership in eradicating the pandemic. Similar medical aid has been observed 
from Cuba in which they send medical personals to Italy. These gestures of 
medical assistance also point to a concerted global effort in curbing the spread 
of the COVID-19 virus.  
Politically, the outbreak of the corona virus could be used as a building 
block to reinforce international cooperation in the world and strengthen the 
pillars of political globalization. Brown and Susskind (2020) cite the EU-led 
global health pledging conference that was committed to raise $8 billion to fund 
the activities of global institutions such as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunization (GAVI) and the WHO that are responsible for coordinating the 
global response to the virus.  In coordinating their efforts, many leaders of the 
G20 group of countries made commitments, including China who made a pledge 
to contribute $20 million to the fund.5 In March 2021, the head of the WHO 
together with a group of world leaders initiated a discussion calling for 
international treaty aimed at enhancing pandemic preparedness and pandemic 
response with a view to new diseases in the post COVID-19 world. 
Development cooperation 
The other sphere of political globalization is development related foreign aid or 
assistance. Given that the COVID-19 pandemic negatively impacted other 
sources of development finance as presented above, such as FDI, remittances 
and trade, countries in Global South were likely in need for foreign aid.  
According to the OECD,6 external financing flows to developing 
economies fell by US$ 700 billion in 2020 as compared to 2019, representing a 
drop by 45 percent. The report further argued that this reduction in external 
financing greatly exceeds the immediate impact of the global financial crisis by 
about 60 per cent. Another recent study by Adam et al. (2020) indicated that aid 
in development assistance require to double in order for sub-Saharan Africa to 
recover. Responses to the substantial gap in development finance highlighted by 
COVID-19 impact appear to be promising. The World Bank has pledged $160 
billion in grants and financial support to 100 developing countries to help them 
address the health, social and economic impacts of COVID-19.7 Apart from 
this, individual countries are also extending economic and development 
assistance to poor countries. For instance, the Netherlands expanded its 
development financing to developing countries by US$ 354 million in September 
 
5 https://healthpolicy-watch.news/countries-pledge-7-36-billion-euro-towards-global-
covid-19-response/, accessed 31 March 2021.  
6 The impact of the coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis on development finance,” Paris: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 24 June 2020, < 
http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/the-impact-of-the-coronavirus-
covid-19-crisis-on-development-finance-9de00b3b/ > accessed 1 April 2021.  
7 https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/05/19/world-bank-
group-100-countries-get-support-in-response-to-covid-19-coronavirus, accessed 2 
April 2021.  
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2020 and plans to contribute a further US$ 548 million for the upcoming years.8 
On March 2021, the U.S set to lead the world in filling the financial aid gap by 
allocating US$11 billion in international aid in the latest COVID Bill.      
Brown (2021), however, has argued that the COVID-19 pandemic has 
greatly accelerated significant positive trends, destabilizing the perception that 
foreign aid essentially flows from the Global North to the Global South and 
reinforcing awareness of the importance of joint efforts for global public goods 
and humanitarian assistance. He further argued that the renewed emphasis on 
self-well-being as the result of COVID-19 places aid in development finance 
central once again.  There is also a need to consider the international fiscal and 
financial system. Van der Hoeven and Vos (2021) argue that the global 
consequences of COVID-19 would have been less severe and that much of the 
increase in global poverty could have been prevented and propose a combined 
package of international tax reform, sovereign debt restructuring and relief, a 
reform of policy conditionality and an increase in the IMF’s special drawing 
rights geared towards developing countries and emerging markets. 
  
 
8 https://borgenproject.org/the-netherlands-foreign-aid/ accessed on 1 April 2021.  
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5 Outlook for globalization after COVID-19: Why are we 
optimistic? 
The first reason for optimism is the noteworthy resilience of world merchandise 
trade and investment during previous global crises. Multinational enterprises 
have already had their stress test during the 2008/9 collapse of world trade. That 
collapse kickstarted the process of deglobalization, but as illustrated in Figure 2 
global merchandise trade and industrial production recovered to previous peak 
quickly and even quicker during the COVID-19 crisis. This is the big and 
fundamental difference with the Great Depression of the 1930s and it may be 
related to the fact that world trade is governed and supported by the multilateral 
trading system. The shock was sharp and immediate, but so was the recovery. 
The so-called invisible flows (FDI, remittances, tourism, official development 
cooperation) have been hit harder and recovery is not to be expected before 
vaccination is sufficiently ‘truly global’, but the expectation of a speedy recovery 
is realistic at the time of writing. 
The attacks on supranational governance and international cooperation 
were a symptom of an underlying disease that paradoxically may have been cured 
by the pandemic. The deglobalization process was driven by increasing inequality 
and a dreary lack of trickling down of the benefits of internationalization. We 
have learned that inequalities are the breeding ground for the spreading of 
disease and the suffering that may follow. Reducing epidemic vulnerabilities 
requires reducing such inequalities. The fight against potential next pandemics, 
however, implies that we cannot limit ourselves to domestic developments only, 
because the inequalities around the world – within and between countries – 
provide the breeding grounds and disease pools from which new variants, 
viruses and other contagious diseases emerge. SDG 10 (Reduced inequalities) 
thus is a high return investment project. 
    And last but not least, the outlook for openness of the world economy is 
still very much better than in the 1930s. Yes, deglobalization exists. Yes, overall 
globalization will probably be lower for the foreseeable future. Our societies 
will, however, remain much more open than at the start of the globalization 
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